Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Cross-world identity, philosophy: is an expression for the problem of how to determine the identity of an object by accepting properties that it does not have in the actual world. Is it meaningful to say that Paul could have been taller in a possible world than he actually is, or would Paul be another individual then? See also possible worlds, modal realism, counterpart theory, counterpart relation, counterparts, telescope theory, centered worlds._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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David Wiggins on Cross World Identity - Dictionary of Arguments
II 303 WigginsVsKripke: even if names are rigid designators: the question remains whether we can evaluate sets of names for all the worlds ("necessary existence"). Problem: cross world identity. >Rigidity, >Names, >Possible worlds, >Necessity, >Contingency, >Centered worlds._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Wiggins I D. Wiggins Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016 Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 |
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> Counter arguments against Wiggins
> Counter arguments in relation to Cross World Identity
